We are two OpenSSL 1.0.2 releases behind:

      Currently running 1.0.2p. Should update to 1.0.2r.

       Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
        *) 0-byte record padding oracle
           If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
           SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
           then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
           record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
           received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
           based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
           amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
           In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in
           use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
           commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
           twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
           this but some do anyway).
           This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod
           Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew
           Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
           [Matt Caswell]
        *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
           [Richard Levitte]
       Changes between 1.0.2p and 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]
        *) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication
           OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been
           shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack.
           An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during
           ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key.
           This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro
           Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and
           Nicola Tuveri.
           [Billy Brumley]
        *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
           The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
           timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
           algorithm to recover the private key.
           This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
           [Paul Dale]
        *) Resolve a compatibility issue in EC_GROUP handling with the FIPS Object
           Module, accidentally introduced while backporting security fixes from the
           development branch and hindering the use of ECC in FIPS mode.
           [Nicola Tuveri]




            • Assignee:
              jp Jan-Philip Gehrcke (Inactive)
              jp Jan-Philip Gehrcke (Inactive)
              ( DO NOT USE ) Security Team
              Jan-Philip Gehrcke (Inactive), Mergebot
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